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IDENTITY AND THE DIVERGENCE OF DISCOURSES 
IN CROATIA AND EUROPE
Siniša Rodin*
Summary: This paper explores the proposition that public discourse 
about the European Union in Croatia is not European, but national. 
The ‘nationalness’ of this discourse about Europe leads to divergent 
constructions of Croatian and European identity, and this, in turn, 
makes inclusion in the EU’s distributive mechanisms more diffi cult. 
The fi rst part of the paper highlights the two discourses that exist in 
Europe - European and national. The second part describes how Croa-
tian and European public discourse about the European Union diverge, 
and what the consequences of this divergence are. In the third part, 
reasons contributing to this divergence are offered, and the dangers of 
such a development for Croatia’s European future are indicated.
Approximately one year ago, speaking at the University of Regens-
burg, Wojciech Sadurski1 highlighted a distinction, originally introduced 
by Bernard Williams,2 between ‘real’ and ‘notional’ confrontation: 
A confrontation is ‘real’ rather than merely notional when an outlook 
of another group is a real option for us. This means that becoming 
like them is reasonably plausible or feasible. It is not just comparing 
ourselves to a culture or an identity which we, in real life, cannot 
resemble anyway, but rather we are confronting a culture with a 
practical implication behind it.3 
While Sadurski is referring to a real confrontation between Euro-
pean and US identity, I myself, as hinted in the Editorial Note to Vol II 
of this Yearbook, am inclined to see things from a different angle, in-
voking the split identity of the fi ctional Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde from the 
novel by Robert Louis Stevenson. During the 20th century, Europe has 
indeed developed a split identity which, on one side of the spectrum, is 
characterised by the two World Wars and the devastating experiences of 
* Jean Monnet Professor, Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb.
1  Wojciech Sadurski, ‘European Constitutional Identity’, paper presented at the 8th Inter-
national Congress on European Constitutional Law (Regensburg, 23-24 June 2006) (not 
yet published).
2  Bernard Williams, ‘The Truth in Relativism’ (1974-75) 75 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 215-28; Sadurski (n 1).
3  Sadurski (n 1) 7.
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Nazism and communism, while, on the other side, there is economic dis-
armament, market integration and, above all, the common experience of 
institution- and society-building. The process of identity-building in the 
European Union has produced an interesting phenomenon. In the ab-
sence of a united identity, national identities have confronted each other, 
typically resulting in armed confl ict. At the same time, international law, 
being fl uid as it is, was not a good opposite against which national iden-
tities could articulate themselves. However, as soon the identity of the 
European Community and its successor, the European Union, started to 
emerge,4 it provided a possible fi rm basis on which a real confl ict could 
emerge. In that respect, Europe’s identity is fundamentally different from 
the identity of the European Union. The former has been characterised 
by armed confl ict, Nazism and communism, the latter by integration, co-
operation, power-sharing, citizenship and tolerance.5 In other words, the 
success of the European Union has created a risk of national identities 
being conceived not against Europe’s negative historical experiences, but 
against the newly created identity of the European Union. If the European 
Union is to live up to the original idea of its founding fathers and preserve 
continental peace, I would suggest that the identity of a united Europe 
should not be constructed in confrontation to any external model, but 
rather in a real confrontation with its other, darker self. In any case, it 
is essential to avoid the danger of national identities being construed in 
opposition to the emerging identity of the European Union. 
The principal proposition that I explore in this paper is that public 
discourse about the European Union in Croatia is not European, but 
national. It is the ‘nationalness’ of this discourse about Europe which 
leads to different constructions of Croatian and European identity, and 
this, in turn, makes inclusion in the EU’s distributive mechanisms more 
diffi cult.
First, I highlight these two discourses - European and national - 
that exist in Europe. Next, I describe how Croatian and European public 
discourse about the European Union diverge, and what some of the con-
sequences of this divergence are. Then I offer some reasons which, to my 
understanding, have brought about such divergence. Finally, I explain 
the dangers of such a development for Croatia’s European prospects. 
4  Possibly starting from the landmark Van Gend en Loos case; see Case 26/62 NV Alge-
mene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration [1963] ECR 1.
5  See eg Van Gend en Loos (n 4): ‘The European Economic Community constitutes a new le-
gal order of international law for the benefi t of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fi elds, and the subjects of which comprise not only the member 
states but also their nationals.’
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The two discourses
Before getting to the point, I should say that I understand “discourse 
on Europe” as a multitude of different communications that can be iden-
tifi ed in politics, the media, science, and public life in general. In speak-
ing about the two discourses - European and national - that generate a 
real confrontation, as defi ned by Williams, I do not imply that the former 
is present exclusively in the European Union or its Member States, and 
the latter exclusively in Croatia. On the contrary, both are found in the 
same space-time continuum, although not distributed evenly. Moreover, 
national discourse in Croatia seems to be not much different from na-
tional discourses in other European states. Having said this, I will start 
from Paul Feyerabend’s position6 that it is not possible to say which one 
of these two discourses, the European or the national, is better; nor is 
it my aim to engage in such an exercise. I do contend, however, that 
one of these two distinct discourses is dominant in Croatia, while the 
other is not. As public discourse contributes decisively to the construc-
tion of identity, it is important to determine which one is dominant and 
understand in which direction is it developing. Here I will present some 
examples.
In Croatia, there is a longstanding and widespread conviction that 
Croatian identity has always been European, due to Croatia’s always 
having been an integral part of European territory, and that membership 
in the European Union cannot make any difference in this respect. By 
this same token, Croatia’s European location, history and culture make 
any substantial reform unnecessary. We are Europe, with or without the 
EU. This understanding, although most frequently found in a political 
context,7 is not limited to political discourse, but can often be heard in 
debates on the reform of various institutions. In contrast to this position, 
Europe is defi ned not territorially, but through common values such as 
liberty, equality, and fundamental rights.8 Acceptance of and respect for 
European values has a central place, while territorial belonging to the 
European continent amounts to a necessary but not suffi cient condition 
for EU membership. 
6  Paul Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (New Left Books, London 1978).
7  See eg speech by Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, speaking at a pre-election rally in Split on 
12 May 2005: ‘My answer to the question why am I so much in favour of the EU is: because 
Croatia has always been part of Europe. Croatia practices European values, and that has 
only to be formalised by accession.’ <http://www.hdz.hr/wbs/w3b.exe/_hr/2/17/1456> 
accessed 20 September 2007.
8  See eg Art 6 TEU [2002] OJ C325/11: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, prin-
ciples which are common to the Member States.’
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Furthermore, it is scarcely questioned in Croatia that the European 
Union restrains Member States in the exercise of their national sover-
eignty, which can ultimately lead to the loss of a barely acquired state-
hood. This contention neglects the well-established fact that the Euro-
pean Union acts via the agency of its Member States, and that national 
sovereignty is a condition for the functioning of the EU. Sovereignty is 
defi ned by the Member States’ capacity to contribute towards achieving 
common goals (their place at the table), while the concept of national sov-
ereignty as summa potestas, enshrined in the Croatian Constitution,9 is 
not jeopardised. On the contrary, Croatia, like any other Member State, 
will be in position to satisfy the obligations of membership only if it can 
fully exercise its national sovereignty.10 Also, as follows from earlier re-
search,11 the voice of the Member States in the process of forming EU 
policies and, more generally, at the European and international level is 
better heard within the framework of EU membership than outside it. For 
example, Croatia’s role in the CFSP has gradually increased from non-
existent to an exchange of information to the possibility of acceding to the 
CFSP Common Positions. Once it becomes a member of the EU, Croatia’s 
voice will be heard at the common table.
Also, there is a widespread fear of foreign investment in Croatia. In 
public discourse this is refl ected in statements to the effect that ‘Croatia 
is being sold off to foreign investors’. The fear of imported goods is seen 
in statements denigrating ‘cheap, low-quality imports’, while the fear of 
migrant workers emerges in the form of active resentment and resistance 
and through the imposition of a variety of barriers, such as complicated 
procedures for mutual recognition of qualifi cations. And the fear of for-
eign services is refl ected in statements such as ‘There is a need for a 
genuinely Croatian bank’, or the more populist slogan ‘A Croatian wallet 
in a Croatian pocket’. These messages are in sharp contrast to the basic 
market freedoms on which the EU economy is based, and which are to be 
exercised regardless of national borders and without any discrimination 
based on nationality whatsoever.
9  Art 2 of the Croatian Constitution, consolidated text (2001) Offi cial Gazette Narodne 
novine 41. 
10  For example, in order to be a member of the customs union, a Member State must 
ensure full control of its national borders. Failure to exercise this aspect of national sover-
eignty is an obstacle to membership.
11  In the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy, see S Rodin, ‘Croatia’ in Steven 
Blockmans and Adam Lazowski (eds), The European Union and its Neighbours: A legal ap-
praisal of the EU’s policies of stabilisation, partnership and integration (T.M.C. Asser Press, 
The Hague 2006) 357, 388; in the context of the free movement of persons, see I Goldner, 
‘Sloboda kretanja ljudi u Europskoj uniji temeljem Europskih sporazuma i Sporazuma o 
stabilizaciji i pridruživanju’, doctoral dissertation (Faculty of Law, Zagreb, 2005).
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Furthermore, in Croatia there is widespread public acceptance of 
special interests that are understood as being national. This has led to 
an entire normative system of social privileges reserved for nationally 
defi ned social groups, such as, for example, Croatian artists being en-
titled to free pension and medical insurance, Croatian pensioners being 
entitled to subsidised pensions, the children of Croatian veterans being 
allowed direct university enrolment, regardless of the numerus clausus, 
and so on. Favouring national interests in the economy is likewise seen 
as justifi ed. For example, a recent study by the Faculty of Transport of 
the University of Zagreb, produced for the Ministry of the Sea, Tourism, 
Transport and Development, proposed direct discrimination against for-
eign truck drivers, who would be stopped at the state border during cer-
tain hours, while national truckers would be admitted into the country.12 
The study emphasises that ‘the state authorities, ie the inspection serv-
ices, must serve to enhance the competitiveness of Croatian truckers’. 
Again, this represents a U-turn from the European standard, defi ned by 
the elimination of discrimination based on nationality and the prohibi-
tion of distinctly applicable measures.13
The divergence of discourses and its consequences
These examples bear witness to the divergence of Croatian national 
and European discourses on key points concerning the creation of Eu-
ropean identity: sovereignty, market freedoms, and non-discrimination. 
This divergence has had several consequences, as follows.
Probably the easiest one to detect is the phenomenon I call seman-
tic dissonance. In diverging discourses, the same words are ascribed a 
different meaning, making communication more diffi cult. The same lan-
guage is applied to different concepts, and so we do not understand each 
other.
Secondly, and more importantly, divergence affects the construc-
tion of identity. National identity is not conceived in contrast to nega-
tive historical experiences, but rather in contrast to European identity. 
Negative historical experiences are often brushed aside,14 while certain 
12  ‘Hrvatska treba zabraniti ulazak kamiona nedjeljom do 20 sati - Fakultet prometnih zna-
nosti predlaže sprjeËavanje ulaza strancima s ekološki neprihvatljivim vozilima’ [‘Croatia 
should prohibit entry of trucks on Sundays till 8 pm - Faculty of Transport proposes block-
ing entry for foreigners driving ecologically unacceptable vehicles’] Poslovni dnevnik (12 
February 2007).
13  See eg Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria, for an infringement of Community law due 
to discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
14  See eg the web page of the Croatian Administrative Court <www.upravnisudrh.hr> ac-
cessed 20 September 2007: ‘The Administrative Court, as an independent court of the 
Republic, was established on 1 July 1977. Before then, judicial review of the legality of indi-
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social phenomena and moral standards are denigrated as being imported 
from Europe and opposed to what are understood as ‘genuine national 
values’. Examples of this abound, including attitudes towards the mar-
ket freedoms, the family, sexual minorities, foreigners, pluralism, and so 
on.
Unlike Croatian national identity, which is conceived, at least in part, 
as opposed to European values, European identity is defi ned in contrast 
to the negative historical experiences of Nazism and communism, and to 
the identity of individual Member States. This can be traced back to the 
very outset of European integration, as is well documented by the Schu-
mann Declaration.15 Today, more than fi fty years later, during which time 
Europe has grown into a continental public order, the same idea has 
been expressed by Marek Cichocki, Poland’s representative for drafting 
the EU’s 50th anniversary declaration.16 Europe must be conceived not 
only in contrast to Nazism, but also to communism and to Balkan-style 
nationalism. Certainly, European identity is not in competition with the 
identity of the Member States, but rather is construed as added value on 
top of national identity.17 This can be understood well from the landmark 
Nold case, where the European Court of Justice asserted that in protect-
ing fundamental rights it was ‘bound to draw inspiration from constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, and […] cannot therefore 
uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recog-
nised and protected by the constitutions of those States’.18
The third consequence of diverging discourses can be described as 
institutional impotence. Croatia’s institutions have remained or become 
unable to create policies that could form part of broader European objec-
tives. The political system and its institutions are incapable of generating 
vidual fi nal administrative acts was overseen by the Administrative Division of the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Croatia. It is important to mention that there is a long tradition of 
administrative justice in the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Administrative jurisdiction 
can be traced back to the second half of the 19th century.’ It is worth noting that the highest 
judicial instance in Croatia in 1977 was not the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, 
but rather the Supreme Court of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. This fact is ignored for 
the purpose of continuity in constructing institutional identity. 
15  The solidarity in production thus established makes it plain that any war between France 
and Germany would be not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.
16  Andrew Rettman, ‘Poland to push for “dark” side to EU birthday text’ EUobserver (22 Feb-
ruary 2007): ‘It shouldn’t simply be a self-celebration by the old member states. It should 
include our part of Europe as a parallel process experienced after WWII. It should also make 
mention of the dark legacy of European policy. During the great successes of extending the 
European Union in the 1990s, we had parallel to that a serious war in the Balkans’ <www.
euobserver.com> accessed 23 February 2007.
17  See Art 2 TEU: ‘The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.’ 
18  Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission [1974] ECR 491.
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decisions that comply with European standards,19 as manifested in the 
‘crisis of the judiciary’, ‘ineffi cient public administration’ or ‘corruption’. 
As institutions are unable to anticipate acceptable outcomes for their ac-
tivity, they often generate disparate results. One striking example is the 
misapplication of the requirements of the Bologna process in higher edu-
cation and false adjustment to the European Qualifi cations Framework. 
The synergetic effect of Croatian legislation and sub-legislation is that 
a two-year university-level degree from Croatia is legally equivalent to a 
bachelor’s degree from a European university, while a four-year Croatian 
bachelor’s degree is equivalent to a European master’s degree.20 Such de-
grees cannot obtain European recognition, while, on the other hand, they 
cause an infl ation of Croatian bachelors and masters and degrade proper 
degrees earned in Europe. Also, laws are not infrequently introduced and 
then scrapped at once, due solely to reaction from the European side.21 
Such institutional impotence is present not only in political institutions, 
but more generally in all spheres of public life.
Furthermore, the insuffi cient penetration of European topics into 
public discourse has created social differentiation between a partici-
pating minority which has access to European resources and a major-
ity which is excluded. Such differentiation adds to the discontent of the 
excluded social group, creating a capillary obstruction of pro-European 
reforms. Generally speaking, resistance to reform is on the rise, and this 
phenomenon is only aggravated by the Croatian public’s exclusion from 
the constitutional debate on the future of the EU. Another example of 
exclusion is the general absence of any debate on the Services Directive, 
despite the fact that tourist services make up a large part of Croatia’s 
GDP.22 Certainly, the fact that Croatia is alone on its way to EU member-
ship means that it is deprived of the unique experience of the enlarge-
ment debate and enlargement discourse.
19  J Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Staatkapitalismus (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1973).
20  See Art 14 of the Nacrt Prijedloga Zakona o akademskim i strucnim nazivima i akadem-
skom stupnju [Draft Academic Qualifi cations Act] of August 2007, available on the Croa-
tian Parliament’s web page <http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=15193&sec=1220> 
accessed 21 September 2007.
21  For example, the recently scrapped law introduced to facilitate the construction of sports 
facilities for the World Handball Championship, which had to be revoked because it violated 
Community public procurement rules. Another example is the introduction of discrimina-
tory registration charges for small boats, as introduced by the Naredba o visini naknade za 
upis broda, jahte i brodice u upisnik brodova, odnosno jahti i o evidnik brodica (2005) Of-
fi cial Gazette Narodne novine 41 and abrogated by the Naredba o izmjeni i dopuni Naredbe 
o visini naknade za upis broda, jahte i brodice u Upisnik brodova, odnosno jahti i o evidnik 
brodica (2006) Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 24.
22  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market [2006] OJ L376/36. 
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Explaining the divergence
I will offer two explanations as to why this divergence of discourses 
about Europe has occurred in Croatia: the re-legitimisation of the old po-
litical elite and the persistence of its traditional links with the economy; 
and a delay in the change of generations. Taken together, these phenom-
ena have contributed to the survival of the old administrative elite.
First, it seems productive to refer here to the post-World War II Brit-
ish experience. It is a commonplace that Britain’s economic fatigue in the 
1950s and 1960s had to do with its status as a victorious force and the 
persistence of traditional links between politics and the economy.23 Ow-
ing to this, traditional industries were able to survive thanks to political 
protectionism, despite their lack of competitiveness. Similarly, Croatia, 
having won the war for independence, has continued to protect non-com-
petitive industries, regardless of whether these are privatised (eg food 
processing) or state-owned (eg shipbuilding). Instead of restructuring un-
der the pressure of market forces, entire industries have sought protec-
tion in the political elite, which has not been de-legitimised like those in 
other post-communist states, but rather has acquired a new legitimacy 
based on the concept of national reconciliation.24 In other words, priva-
tisation was arranged by the old social elite, which partly transformed 
itself into the nouveaux riches and partly entered into practical interest 
arrangements with the new capitalist class. In this way, the old political 
elite, invigorated by the new national legitimacy, has ‘protected’ Croatia’s 
‘national capital’ from internationalisation, that is, from the acceptance 
of European free market principles.25
The second explanation for the divergence of discourses is a delayed 
change of generations. As I have already pointed out, one of the main 
problems slowing down Croatia’s entry into the European mainstream is 
that Croatian identity is not conceived against the negative historical ex-
23  Neil Rollings, ‘British Industry and European Integration 1961-1973: From First Appli-
cation to Final Membership’ (1998) 27 Business and Economic History 2, 444.
24  See eg Silvana OruË Ivoš, ‘Umjesto mladih stranke nude potrošene politiËare’ [‘Instead 
of young people, parties offer worn-out politicians’] Vjesnik (26 February 2007) 5. Politi-
cal analyst Davor Gjenero supports this view, explaining that ‘after four electoral cycles it 
would be reasonable to expect that major shifts of generations would occur in certain politi-
cal parties. Nothing like this has happened. In 2000 we did not have a single public fi gure 
on the political scene who was not already an important political fi gure before then; that is, 
we did not have any new political fi gures.’ National reconciliation of the left and right was 
one of the main aims of the late President Tuman, who was himself a converted member 
of the Communist Party.
25  Social Democrat MP Neven Mimica, speaking before the Croatian Parliament’s Euro-
pean Integration Committee, warned against Croatia’s slowness in harmonising its law 
with the acquis on 17 February 2007. At the present pace, Croatian law will not be har-
monised with the acquis before 2019. <http://bosna.odisej.hr/magazin/vijesti/vijesti2006.
asp?vijest=1003> accessed 20 September 2007.
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periences of Nazism and communism, but rather against European iden-
tity, and so, for that reason, European standards are understood not as 
originally Croatian, but as something ‘imposed’ from outside. Such a con-
struction of national identity has had a decisive impact on the conditions 
of reproduction of the social elite. The change of generations in Croatia 
either did not occur or, where it did, was controlled by the old social 
elites who were able to invest in their own successors. Examples of this 
can be found in public television, the judiciary, science, and education. 
Such conditions of social transition are not incidental, but rather result 
from a carefully designed regulatory policy. For example, the Courts Act 
provides that, in order to qualify for the position of judge on the High 
Commercial Court or Administrative Court, a candidate must have at 
least 8 years of practice as a judge, or at least 12 years of working ex-
perience as an attorney, professor of law, or public notary; judges of the 
Supreme Court must meet a 15-year requirement.26 It is absolutely clear 
that even today (not to mention the 1990s) such requirements could only 
be satisfi ed by persons who acquired their legal education under com-
munism. One might wonder whether this reliance on traditional socialist 
legal education has contributed to the crisis of the judiciary and public 
administration described repeatedly in reports by European institutions, 
which emphasise the need for their reform, including the reform of legal 
education.27 
The survival and integration of the old administrative elite is also 
facilitated by various legislative arrangements. For example, Article 93 
of the Law on Public Offi cials and Public Servants28 of 4 October 1994 
provides that public offi cials need not pass the public service exam if they 
have at least 10 years of experience. This provision has enabled the sur-
26 Article 75 of the Zakon o sudovima [Courts Act] (2005) Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 
150, incorporating earlier provisions.
27  According to the EUobserver (1 March 2007), ‘[t]he six-page draft Report of the Euro-
pean Parliament, prepared by Austrian socialist Hannes Swoboda, is particularly critical 
of Croatia’s treatment of suspected war criminals as well as judicial and administrative 
reform’. <http://euobserver.com/?aid=23605> accessed 10 March 2007. See also EC Com-
mission, ‘Croatia 2006 Progress Report’ (Commission Staff Working Document) COM (2006) 
649 fi nal: ‘As regards professionalism and competence in the judiciary, there has been 
limited progress.’ The need to reform the judiciary is also emphasised in the Negotiating 
Framework: ‘In all areas of the acquis, Croatia must bring its institutions, management 
capacity and administrative and judicial systems up to Union standards with a view to 
implementing the acquis effectively or, as the case may be, being able to implement it ef-
fectively in good time before accession. At the general level, this requires a well-function-
ing and stable public administration built on an effi cient and impartial civil service, and 
an independent and effi cient judicial system.’ European Council, ‘Negotiating Framework: 
Principles governing the negotiations’ (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005) <http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/pdf/st20004_05_HR_framedoc_en.pdf> accessed 20 September 2007.
28  Zakon o državnim službenicima i namještenicima i o plaÊama nositelja pravosudnih 
dužnosti (1994) Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 74.
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vival of public servants employed after 1984. Therefore, involvement in 
pre-democratic institutions is not only not an obstacle, but even a recom-
mendation for appointment to the highest public offi ces. No wonder one 
Member of Parliament recently remarked, with regard to a possible ap-
pointee for the position of Constitutional Court judge, that the candidate 
was ‘an excellent lawyer, and already a judge of the Constitutional Court 
during the former Yugoslavia’.29
However, it is still possible to observe a difference between institu-
tions that Croatia ‘inherited’ from socialist Yugoslavia, such as its courts 
of law, some ministries, or its universities, and institutions that have 
been newly created for specifi c purposes of modernisation and European-
isation, such as the Croatian Competition Agency, the State Commission 
for Public Procurement Control, and others. By necessity, these new in-
stitutions have had to employ younger, better-qualifi ed public servants. 
The difference between ‘old-style’ and ‘new-style’ institutions and the 
dynamics of their relationship are nicely illustrated by a recent judg-
ment of the Croatian Administrative Court,30 annulling a decision by the 
Croatian Competition Agency. The Agency, with reference to Community 
competition rules applicable pursuant to Article 70 of the Stabilisation 
Agreement, had declared a vertical distribution agreement illegal. Accord-
ing to the Administrative Court judgment, however, ‘the criteria, stand-
ards and instruments of the European Communities to which the Agency 
refers are not contained in the text of the [Stabilisation and Association] 
Agreement, and are not transposed or published in any other Croatian 
law or act, and therefore cannot be a source of law’. Without entering into 
a more detailed legal analysis of this judgment, suffi ce it to say that the 
Agency, by applying the interpretative standards of Community law, had 
reached one conclusion, while the Administrative Court, excluding those 
standards, had reached the opposite one. 
The persistence of the ‘old cadre’ is not exclusive to the judiciary and 
public service. For instance, the Museums Act31 lists the requirements 
that must be satisfi ed by a museum director, including a university di-
ploma and the state exam. Exceptionally, however, a person without the 
required qualifi cations but with 10 years’ experience may be appointed. 
In other words, work experience can substitute for a university degree. 
At the same time, integration of the up-and-coming generation of 
young professionals, educated at European and American universities, is 
29  N BožiÊ, A PlišiÊ, ‘Mogao bih biti potpredsjednik Vlade ili sudac Ustavnog suda’ [‘I could 
be deputy prime minister or a Constitutional Court judge’] Jutarnji list (12 March 2007).
30  Judgment of the Administrative Court No Us-5438/2003-7 of 26 October 2006 (2007) 
Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 16.
31  Zakon o muzejima (1998) Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 142.
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made excessively diffi cult by strict rules on the recognition of qualifi ca-
tions. The net effect of the Law on the Recognition of Foreign Qualifi ca-
tions32 and the Science and Higher Education Act33 is that the qualifi ca-
tions of students who have completed master’s degree level studies in 
the European Union are granted the same value as those of students 
who have completed a four-year undergraduate programme in Croatia 
and other states of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, master’s degrees 
from the most prestigious universities in Europe are formally equated 
with four-year bachelor’s degrees from any university in the former Yu-
goslavia. Such legislative policy discourages study abroad and makes the 
integration of returning students more diffi cult. 
In brief, for the reasons stated above, European discourse in Croatia 
is channelled through unreformed institutions and thus muted or wrong-
ly interpreted, generating a semantic dissonance. For example, the per-
ception of Europe is formed via discourse on the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and not on European reform, en-
largement, institutions, or values. Another phenomenon is the projection 
of certain local issues as European ones, for example, the border dispute 
with Slovenia or the question of the esuli (post-WWII Italian refugees from 
Yugoslavia). Such issues do not form part of European identity; on the 
contrary, they represent its dark side, against which European discourse 
should be constructed. 
Conclusion
The fi rst wave of transition in Croatian society did not take place 
in an environment of European discourse. As a consequence, it did not 
bring about a Europeanisation of Croatia’s institutions and Croatian so-
ciety in general. The change of generations has occurred only partially, 
and in such a way as to enable functional integration into the European 
mainstream under conditions predominantly dictated by the communist 
and post-communist elites. Today the change of generations is complete; 
yet it has not brought about a Europeanisation of Croatian institutions, 
but rather a perpetuation of national discourse. 
In such circumstances, the key question is not when Croatia will 
join the EU, but rather whether, at the moment of accession, Croatian 
society will be capable of taking part in mainstream European discourse 
and thereby maximising the benefi ts of membership. At the moment, no 
32  Zakon o priznavanju inozemnih obrazovnih kvalifi kacija (2003) Offi cial Gazette Narodne 
novine 158, as amended by the Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o priznavanju in-
ozemnih obrazovnih kvalifi kacija, (2006) Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 138.
33  Zakon o znanstvenoj djelatnosti i visokom obrazovanju (2003) Offi cial Gazette Narodne 
novine 123, as amended.
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such capacity is evident. Unless Croatian society becomes capable of 
absorbing the positive redistributive effects of prospective membership, 
the frustration generated by its reduced ability to utilise the benefi ts of 
the pre-accession period may lead to public opinion turning against EU 
membership.
